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Summary:
This paper proposes a method for establishing transfer prices based on
the Shapley value. This is done by determining an agreed-upon weighting of
factors of profitability within a firm, and then allocating the direct costing
gross margin of the firm to its divisions by means of these factors and the
Shapley value.
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Tlie allocation of profit to divisions that results from this tech-
nique is a negotiated one only to the extent that those managerial factors
most relevant to firm profit must first be agreed upon. Once reached,
such an agreement eliminates periodic bargaining on transfer prices and
embodies certain properties of equity that are suggested by the Shapley
value
.
We shauLl also show the close relationship of the proposed allocation
method to a widely used technique for the calculation of state corporation
and franchise taxes, known as the "Massachusetts formula." This technique
has grown out of the efforts of the states to take into account the complex
causality of income in a Federal System which permits corporations to
domicile in whatever state they choose while engaging in productive oper-
ations and marketing their goods wherever they choose.
An Illustration of the Procedure
The procedure can perhaps best be explained by a numerical example.
We assume a centralized planning body using a mathematical programming
model to generate its forthcoming production schedule as follows:
Max Profit = 2x- + 4x2 "^ ^-^x^ + 8x,
S.t (1) x^ + X2 + 1.2x^ + 2x^ <_ 250
(2) x^ + 1.5x3 "*" -^^4 - "°°
(3) X, + 1.5x^ £ 150
and all x is ^i
Assume that there are three major divisions In the firm and that con-
straints 1 to 3 represent the capacity limits of the divisions respec-
tively. Product one, x^ is a processed raw material which can be sold
The transfer pricing problem has given rise to an extensive litera-
ture, in which several ways have been suggested for determining the prices
of intermediate products. These ways include systems based on:
1) Market prices
2) Marginal costs or variable costs when the cost function is
not known
3) Average costs plus or full cost plus, either actual or
s tandard »
4) Opportunity costs or shadow prices
5) Negotiated prices, for which negotiation might be initiated
from any of the previous four methods.
In general there is no qxiarrel that when competitive market prices
exist, these prices, adequately adjusted for Internal economies of the
4
integrated firm, should be the prices used to calculate divisional profits,
Difficulties arise, however, whenever there is no clear market price for
an intermediate product and whenever integrated firms are required or
whenever they elect to treat as profit centers their own divisions ex-
changing intermediate products.
This paper will examine a method for establishing transfer prices
based on the Shapley value. The approach is a form of variable cost
"plus" pricing, in which the "plus" or, addition to variable cost, is de-
termined according to an agreed-upon weighting of factors of profitability.
In an ex ante planning process, the Shapley value will be used to dis-
tribute profit after the optimal schedule of production has been deter-
mined. Subsequent to this profit distribution, transfer prices will
be calculated. A consequence of this approach is that the resulting
transfer prices are neutral with respect to decision-making.
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Table 2
Profit Factors for 197x Profit
Profit Factors
Division Division
1 2
i
Division
3 Total for Firm
Total Assets $ 1550 $ 2000 $ 1200 $ 4750.00
Total Payroll 300 500 300 1100.00
Total Sales $ 180
1
1
$ 2666.67 $ 2846.66
We have no special reason for selecting these factors as most appro-
priate among those that are relevant to producing income. However, we
do note that these profit factors are the same ones which states employ to
assess the causal relationships for generating the income of corporations
operating within their taxing jurisdictions.
In Table 2 Total Assets are simply the debt side of the profit
center's balance sheet, (we assume that these totals are the average of '^
the opening and closing balances). Total Payroll includes not only ""caC
direct labor as embodied in the c.'s, but also supervisory, sales,
J ^ ,. . 1
and administrative persopjiel of the divisions. As such, each total
payroll represents the responsibility of a division's management for the
direction of its own personnel, for the training of that personnel, for
union relationships, etc. Finally Total Sales are the totals of ultimate
deliveries by the firm to outside markets at freely competitive prices.
Specifically , the sales values which are given in Table 2 are those for
the solution of our illustrative example.
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by Division 1 at a competitive market price. Product x„ is a semi-
finished good sold to manufacturers by Division 2 at a competitive market
price. Products x„ and x, are manufactured goods, x_ being a low cost
good and x, being a higher quality, more carefully finished version of
T.y
Additionally, we know the per unit prices and variable costs of the
X, 's as these costs are incurred in each division processing them.
Table 1
Prices and Variable Costs
\
$ 8 $ 12 $ 20 $ 25
6 5.5 3.50 4
- 2.5 7.00 8.50
_ _ 4.00 4.50
6 8 , 14.50 17.00
2 4 5.50 8.00
Variable Cost - Div. 1
2
3
Total Variable Cost
Contribution Margin, c.
And we also know, as any self respecting budget office would, the total
assets and the payroll of the "profit centers" required to implement this
schedule of production (refer to Table 2)
.
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total assets downwards by x-'s utilization of Division I's total capa-
city, i.e., by 90/250.
Table 2 Revised
Profit Factors for 197x Budget Adjusted to Eliminate
Separate Market Transactions
Profit Factors Division 1 Division 2 Division 3 Total
Total Assets
Total Payroll
Total Sales
$ 1000
200
$ 2000
500
$ 1200
300
2667
$ 4200
1000
2667
Calculation of Transfer Prices
Now we proceed to the calculation of transfer prices. First we
observe from our income statement that the mark-up oh product x^ is
approximately 38%. Then we calculate for every coalition of divisions
the gross margin which appertains to that coalition of divisions given
its total variable costs. (Refer to Table 3, Column 3). Next, xising
Table 2 Revised, we calculate for each coalition its profit factor appor-
tionment ratio in colvmin 4. An interpretation of this ratio is that it
represents the extent to which all of the possible coalitions of divisions
utilize the full services of the firm and benefit from the integrated 4' •.,;
power of the firm. One can think of the existence of each of the separate
sub-coalitions (Including coalitions of a single division) as represen-
tative of groups "going it alone," i.e., groups obliged to buy goods and
services of all sorts outside of the firm and thus forced to share '
profits with outsiders. The grand coalition of all divisions is the '"^
fully Integrated firm whlich benefits from the total income producing
power of the firm. ' ; , 1 •• .
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Profit $913.33 Shadow Prices
x^ 90 units Division 1 Capacity $ 2.000
x» 133 1/3 units Division 2 Capacity 2.067
x^ 16 2/3 units [slack of Div. 3] Division 3 Capacity
A pro forma income statement for this budgeted schedule of production
follows
Pro Forma Income Statement for 197x Budget
Sales Revenue
Less j Division 1
Cost of / Division 2
Goods Sold: ] Division 3
Sub Total
Gross Margin
Only one adjustment to our data remains to be made before we cal-
culate internal transfer prices. Wherever competitive market prices
exist, and sales are made at those prices in such a way that ve can
completely disengage those transactions from the rest of the company's
income statement and from Table 2 (The Table of Profit Factors), we
shall do so. Specifically, for our problem we make this adjustment for
x^ , the revenues and costs of which can be eliminated easily from the
income statement. We also must adjust Table 2 to eliminate x^ sales and
payroll costs from Divison 1 data and to revise Division 1 total property
so that it will represent only those assets committed to x-. Here, the
"bugaboo" of cost allocation must be faced. We do this by adjusting
\ X3
$ 2666.66
Total
$ 720 $ 2846.66
540 466.66 1006.66
— 933.33 933.33
- 533.33
1933.33
533.33
540 2473.33
$ 180 $ 733.33 $ 913.33
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Table 3
Divisional Coalititions , Apportionment Ratios and Profits
Col (1) Col (2) Col (3) Col (4) Col (5)
Coalition
of V .:
Division
Variable
Costs
Mark-up
Col (2)
:x38%
Profit Factor Apportionment Ratio
Adjusted
Coalition
Profit
Col (3) X
Col (4) = 5
1 $ 466.66 $ 177
1 , 1000 . 200 ,
3 ^ 4200 1000 2667
^ .146 $ 26
2 933.33 354
1 , 2000 500 ,
3 ^ 4200 1000 2667
^ .327 116
3 533.33 202
1
f
1200 300 2667 ^
3 W2OO 1000 2667 ^ .526 106
1 + 2 1400.00 531
1 , 3000 700 ,
3 ^ 4200 1000 2667
^ .470 249
1 + 3 1000.00 379
1 , 2200 500 2667
-,
3 ^. 4200 1000 2667 ^
" .675 256
2 + 3 1466.67 556
1 r 3200 800 2667 ,
3 ^ 4200 1000 2667
' .837 465
i, 2 + 3 1933.33 733
1 , 4200 1000 2667 ,
3 ^ 4200 1000 2667 ^
" 1.000 733
Finally, using Column 5, Adjusted Coalition Profit (ACT), we allocate
the $733 profit from intermediate product sales of x^ to divisions using
the Shapley value. Profit allocation to each division is:
'*•-
. ^ »'i
.
,,
Share of Profit ^ ^ (s-1) ! (n-s)
I
(acp(S) - ACP(S-{i}))
.
Allocated to Division _ „ nl :_ .;.
SeN
vhere s is the number of divisions In coalition S and n is 3, the total
number of divisions. The results are nresented in Table 4.
:»jii'-
.->?
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Table 4
Calculation of Transfer Prices
Col 1 Col 2 Col 3 Col 4 Col 5
Per Unit Vari- Carried Forward
Shapley Profit Divisional Profit able Cost from Col. 5
Allocation Col (1) ^ 133 1/3 Cost of Previous Transfer
Units per Unit Division Price
Div 1 $ 145.17 $ 1.09 $ 3.50 $ $ 4.59/unit
2 294.66 2.21 7.00 4.59 13.80
3 293.16 2.20 4.00 13.80 20.00
Total 733.00
Connnents About the Procedure
This method of setting transfer prices has been offered and explained
in the framework of a mathematically programmed budget solution. However,
note that a mathematically programmed budget is not at all necessary since
the same calculations could have been made for a production schedtile generated
by clever intuition or by gross incompetence (albeit, for a more or less
diminished profit). Putting the calculation in the framework of an l.p,
model does illustrate that this transfer pricing method in no way inter-
feres with optimal decision making.
Behaviorly we do not see how it suffers from any of the many complaints
levied at other transfer pricing procedures. Unlike an opportunity cost or
shadow price approach, it does not reward bottlenecks and penalize long
range provisions of capacity to the benefit of short run maximizers. It
is neither biased in favor of the buyer (be he monopolist) or in favor of
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the seller (be he Bsonopolist) . As P^oth and Verrecchla have pointed out
(and assuming that agreement can be arrived at regarding factors contri-
buting to profit) the Shapley value provides a one-time negotiated proce-
9
dure which is equitable. Although a division nsanager might be induced
to overstate the portion of his division's assets and payroll to be devoted
to the production of intermediate products, there is every reason, in fact,
to him to use labor and capital as efficiently as possible, since profit
can only be enjoyed if a manager helps to create it. Some readers will
argue that too heavy a weighting has been accorded to sales. That may
very well be. If 5 in any particular case it proves to be so, management
must then decide on a priori, negotiated basis how best to weight selling
effort, or personnel nsanagement, or the operation and maintenance of
plants. For firms which wish to xise an ROI measure of the management
of profit centers, the Shapley value allocation makes a profit attribution
to assets such that an ROI calculation can readily be made.
All in all, if we are willing to assume the admittedly difficult task
of specifying those responsibilities of management which cause profit,
i.e., the "factors of profitability", then we have a technique which
does the following. It supplements decision making without interfering
in it; it recognizes the need for measuring relevant variable costs but
attributes profit to centers in a manner compatible with top management's
desire to measure performance on the basis of multiple factors, such as
return on investment, personnel management and market results.
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r
.s)1 ) In State Prooerty , in State Property , In State Sales I . ^. ^ r, ^t—
i
-— —-— ' ^ + — — - •,--;; 'hrr—^ + —
=
:;
—
tt-z f = Apportionment Ratio
3 i^ Total Property Total Payroii Total Sales )
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total corporate-wide income, its apportionment'^.'and the tax rate^ as
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